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THE DOCTRINE OF FOREIGN EQUIVALENTS AT DEATH'S DOOR
Serge Krimnus*
The Federal Circuit, the Patent Office, and several regional
circuits apply the trademark law doctrine of foreign equivalents.
Under the doctrine, marks in foreign languages are translated into
English and tested for the statutory bars to registration, instead of
being tested in their original form. The doctrine is applied even in
cases where only a negligible percentage of the purchasing public
would be able to translate the foreign mark.
I argue that the Federal Circuit should abolish the doctrine of
foreign equivalents from trademark law for two reasons. First, the
doctrine violates directly applicable Supreme Court precedent,
which rejects the doctrine. Second, the doctrine makes little sense
as a matter of policy. It contravenes the basic goal of trademark
law-to protect a substantial portion of the public-by allowing
courts to refuse registration of marks where only a minuscule
portion of the public would be confused, deceived, or otherwise
affected by a mark. Moreover, the doctrine is unworkable because
it lacks reasoning, creates confusion and is inconsistently applied
by the courts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a state of the law where a trademark can be refused
registration where less than a mere 0.01% of the purchasing public
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is confused by the mark.' Such a rule seems antithetical to the
basic purpose of trademark law-"to protect the public's
expectation regarding the source and quality of goods." 2
Unfortunately, this is exactly the current state of affairs under the
doctrine of foreign equivalents.
In trademark proceedings before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (the "USPTO" or the "Patent Office") and in
trademark infringement actions in federal courts, the judicially
created doctrine of foreign equivalents generally applies to marks
containing foreign words.' Under the doctrine, words from
common foreign languages are translated into English prior to
being tested for the statutory bars to registration.'
See infra note 184.
2 Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 993 (9th Cir. 2006).
See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 11:34 (4th ed. 2010). The doctrine is occasionally referred to as
"the doctrine of foreign equivalence." E.g., Hom's Inc. v. Sanofi Beaute Inc.,
No. 95 Civ. 2994 (CSH), 1995 WL 360131, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 1995)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Ex parte Odol-
Werke Wien Gesellschaft M.B.H., 111 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 286 (Comm'r Pat.
1956)); In re Hans Merensky Holdings (PTY) Ltd., No. 76528639, 2005 WL
1787233, at *3 (T.T.A.B. June 28, 2005) (referring to the doctrine using both
variations); In re Armour and Co., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 76, 78 n.2 (T.T.A.B.
1983). The doctrine's full name appears to have been coined in Rosenblum v.
George Willsher & Co., 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 492 (T.T.A.B. 1969), although the
term "foreign equivalent" was used by the Patent Office in a trademark context
as early as 1911. See Ex parte Julius Wile Sons & Co., 1911 Dec. Comm'r Pat.
81, 82.
42 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:34; see generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra
note 3, § 11:83 (discussing the doctrine of foreign equivalents as it applies to a
distinctiveness analysis). In ex parte trademark registration proceedings, the
Patent Office may refuse to register trademarks, primarily based on Section 2 of
the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 3,
§ 19:75 (discussing statutory bars to registration).
The most common grounds for refusal of registration are likelihood of
confusion and lack of distinctiveness. See Philip J. Greene, Trademark Counsel
in the Federal Government-A Practitioner's Perspective, 86 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 361, 381 (2004); Christopher C. Larkin, Section 2(d)
and (e)(1) Refusals and Substantive Issues in Ex Parte Appeals: the Applicant's
Perspective, 959 PLI/Pat 45, 49 (2009). Refusals for likelihood of confusion
(confusing similarity) with existing marks are "by far the most common." 3
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I argue that in the Federal Circuit's recent In re Spirits
International' decision, the court sub silentio abolished the
doctrine as it applies to one specific bar to registration-primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks under subsection
2(e)(3) of the Lanham Act.6 Although the Spirits court expressly
limited its analysis to primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive marks,' courts cannot justify refusing to extend
Spirits' reasoning to other bars to registration.
I further argue that the doctrine of foreign equivalents should
be abolished for two reasons. First, I argue that a nineteenth
century Supreme Court decision-Menendez v. Holt--rejects the
doctrine of foreign equivalents.' Menendez has not been overruled
or revisited by the Supreme Court, and no other court has
questioned its validity in discussing the doctrine."o Despite this
fact, the Federal Circuit ignores Menendez and continues to apply
the doctrine. The Federal Circuit must, under stare decisis,
faithfully apply Menendez and abolish the doctrine.
Second, I argue that the doctrine makes little sense on policy
grounds." Since the goal of trademark law is to protect the
public,12 courts have long recognized the requirement of
proportionality-that a substantial portion of the public must be
confused, deceived, or consider a mark non-distinctive-for the
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 19:75.
Other grounds for refusal, which are less common but relevant to this article,
are geographic deceptiveness refusals. Under subsections 2(a) and 2(e)(3) of the
Lanham Act, marks which deceive consumers as to the geographic source of the
goods are not registrable. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a), 1052(e)(3) (2006); In re
Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
563 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
6 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3).
7 See Spirits, 563 F.3d at 1356 n.5.
8 128 U.S. 514, 520 (1888).
9 See infra Part VI.A.
10 One court, however, implicitly suggested, without explanation, that
Menendez may be an exception to the doctrine. See infra note 165.
" See infra Part VI.B.
12 See, e.g., Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 993 (9th Cir.
2006).
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relevant statutory bar to registration to apply. 3 The doctrine of
foreign equivalents disregards this long-standing principle and
allows a mark to be refused registration where only an insignificant
portion of the public can understand the mark and thus, consider it
confusing, deceiving, or non-distinctive. 4 Moreover, the doctrine
is unworkable since nearly every aspect of it is confusing or
unreasoned, and Spirits has caused the Patent Office to apply the
doctrine differently depending on the bar to registration at issue."
I conclude that the Federal Circuit should continue what it
started in Spirits and apply stare decisis as well as policy
considerations to abolish the doctrine of foreign equivalents in its
entirety. In Part II, I discuss the development of the doctrine,
including its history beginning in the late nineteenth century. In
Part III, I focus on the modern doctrine. In Part IV, I discuss the
'3 See In re Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("[I]t is
clear that section (e)(3)-like subsection (a), the false advertising provision of
the Lanham Act, and the common law requires that a significant portion of the
relevant consuming public be deceived."); see also Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v.
Stamatios Mouratidis, No. 77208071, 2010 WL 2191893, at *3 (T.T.A.B. May
21, 2010) (recognizing that a mark is misdescriptive if "the misdescription [is]
likely to affect a significant portion of the relevant consumers' decision to
purchase" (citing In re Budge Mfg. Co. Inc., 857 F.2d 773 (Fed. Cir. 1988))); In
re Zuffa, LLC, No. 76/273,529, 2003 WL 22055674, at *6 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 29,
2003) (holding that a mark is descriptive if a "significant portion" of the
purchasing public would consider it so).
Other bars to registration also apply the requirement of proportionality. See,
e.g., In re RK Netmedia, Inc., Nos. 77060742, 77060766, 2009 WL 1713998, at
*2 (T.T.A.B. May 21, 2009) ("[T]he determination of whether a proposed mark
will be perceived as scandalous or immoral [under Section 2(a)] is ascertained
from [the standpoint of] 'a substantial composite of the general public."'
(quoting In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994)));
Toro Co. v. ToroHead Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1164, 1183 (T.T.A.B. 2001)
("[Dilution by] blurring occurs when a substantial percentage of consumers . . .
associate the junior party's use with the owner of the famous mark . . . ."). The
one exception is the bar on disparaging marks under Section 2(a), which is
ascertained "from the standpoint of a substantial composite of the referenced
group." In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1215, 1218
(T.T.A.B. 2010) (citing In re Heeb Media LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071,
1074 (T.T.A.B. 2008)).
'4 See infra Part VI.B.1.a.
' See infra Part VI.B.2.
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Federal Circuit's recent Spirits decision. In Part V, I discuss the
aftermath of Spirits in the Patent Office, and in Part VI, I argue
that both policy considerations as well as Supreme Court precedent
mandate the abolition of the doctrine of foreign equivalents.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Development of the Doctrine in the Patent Office
Since the very inception of the doctrine of foreign equivalents,
the Patent Office has been inconsistent in its application." In
1876, the Patent Office applied the doctrine for the first time. In
Lawrence & Co., 7 the applicant attempted to register trademarks
consisting of German words, which would be descriptive'" of the
goods to a German speaker. 9 The Commissioner, relying on the
Supreme Court's seminal decision in Delaware & Hudson Canal
Co. v. Clark,2 0 explained that a mark may only be registered if it is
"distinctive in its original signification."2' The Commissioner
interpreted the Supreme Court's "original signification" language
to mean that a mark containing foreign words should be translated
and then tested for the bars to registration.22 Accordingly, the
Commissioner translated the marks, held them to be descriptive,
16 The doctrine had no formal name at the time. See supra note 3.
'7 1876 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 155, cited with approval in Ex parte Henderson,
1898 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 647, 648.
'8 Id. at 156-57. Under nineteenth century trademark law, a mark was not
registrable if it was "merely descriptive of an article of trade, of its qualities,
ingredients, or characteristics." Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 311, 323 (1871). Under modem trademark law, however, descriptive
marks may be registered if they have acquired "secondary meaning." See 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:25. That is, descriptive marks may be registered
if consumers consider "such marks as denoting only one seller or source." Id.;
see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006).
'9 Lawrence, 1876 Dec. Comm'r Pat. at 156.
20 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311.
21 Lawrence, 1876 Dec. Comm'r Pat. at 156 (quoting Clark, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) at 323). Under the 1870 Act, marks could only be registered if they were
distinctive, i.e., not generic or merely descriptive. See Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
at 317.
22 Lawrence, 1876 Dec. Comm'r Pat. at 156-57.
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and affirmed the examiner's refusal of registration.23
But in at least one early case, foreign words were considered
registrable by the Patent Office. In 1894, in Ex parte Grove,24 the
Commissioner explained that the mark at issue is not registrable
since it "is not a fanciful term, nor is it a foreign word,"25
suggesting that all foreign words are per se registrable.2 6 In 1902,
however, the Patent Office inexplicably changed course and again
applied the doctrine.27 The Patent Office, without mentioning
Grove or Lawrence,28 and instead relying on one of the first federal
cases to apply the doctrine, adopted the federal case's reasoning
and applied the doctrine. 29 The Patent Office has not looked back
23 Id. at 157. Lawrence, however, was not the first case to consider the
doctrine. At least one earlier state case had considered and rejected the doctrine.
See Rillet v. Carlier, 61 Barb. 435 (N.Y. Sup. 1870) (syllabus) ("Where one has
adopted a word from the French language . . . he acquires, by such adoption, a
property in the use of the word as applied to the article he has made and
introduced into the market, although the article was previously sold in France by
the same name," even if the mark would be generic to French consumers.).
24 1894 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 69.
25 Id. at 70 (emphasis added). "Arbitrary or fanciful marks are ones that do
not communicate any information about the product either directly or by
suggestion." Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd. 412 F.3d 373, 385 (2d Cir.
2005) (citation omitted). Arbitrary and fanciful marks receive the highest
degree of protection. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537
F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) ("Arrayed in an ascending order which roughly reflects
their eligibility to trademark status and the degree of protection accorded, these
classes are (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or
fanciful."), cited with approval in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
26 Grove, 1894 Dec. Comm'r Pat. at 70. Some 40 years later, the applicant's
successor was finally able to register the mark under the ten-year clause of the
1905 Trademark Act. See Ex parte Paris Med. Co., 20 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 164
(Comm'r Pat. 1934) (citing Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 724, 725
(the "1905 Act") (declaring that descriptive marks are registrable if used
exclusively "ten years next preceding the passage of this Act")); see also
Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids, 233 U.S. 461 (1914) (discussing ten-year
clause).
27 Ex parte Grocers Specialty Mfg. Co., 1903 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 10, 11-12.
28 The Patent Office generally follows stare decisis. See McCormick v. Cleal,
1897 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 55, 63 ("[S]tare decisis must prevail here, as in the
courts . . . ."), rev'd on other grounds, 12 App. D.C. 335 (D.C. Cir. 1898).
29 Grocers Specialty, 1903 Dec. Comm'r Pat. at 11-12 (citing Dadirrian v.
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since and, with few exceptions,30 has continued to apply the
doctrine." However, it was not until fifteen years after Grove that
a court reviewing a decision of the Office would discuss the
doctrine of foreign equivalents.32
B. Development of the Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit and C. C.P.A.
Under the first modem federal trademark registration act (the
"1905 Act"), Congress vested the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia with appellate jurisdiction over trademark-
related appeals from the Commissioner of Patents of the USPTO
(the "Commissioner").34 In In re Hercules Powder Co.," the
applicant argued to the D.C. Circuit that the mark at issue would
Yacubian, 98 F. 872 (1st Cir. 1900)).
30 The doctrine is not applied when it is "[un]likely that the ordinary American
purchaser would 'stop and translate [the word] into its English equivalent."'
Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396
F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Pan Tex Hotel Corp., 190
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 109, 110 (T.T.A.B. 1976)); see infra Part IV. This exception is
quite limited, however, since the Patent Office has interpreted "ordinary
American purchaser" to mean a purchaser "knowledgeable in the foreign
language." In re Thomas, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1021, 1024 (T.T.A.B. 2006);
infra Part IV.A. Such purchasers would "ordinarily be expected to translate
words into English." In re Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
31 See, e.g., In re Marchesi de Frescobaldi Societa Agricola S.p.A., No.
79021733, 2008 WL 3917506, at *4 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2008) ("[l]t is accepted
that [under the doctrine of foreign equivalents] 'words from modem languages
are generally translated into English."' (quoting Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1377)).
32 In re Hercules Powder Co., 46 App. D.C. 52 (D.C. Cir. 1917).
3 See the 1905 Act, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724; see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note
3, § 5:3 (discussing the 1870, 1881 and 1905 trademark acts). Although
Congress had previously enacted interstate trademark registration legislation, it
was struck down as unconstitutional in The Trade-Mark Cases. See Act of July
8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, 210-212, invalidated by The Trade-
Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). Two years after the 1870 Act was struck down
by the Supreme Court, Congress passed another trademark registration act. See
Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502. This act, however, only provided
for registration of marks used in commerce with foreign nations and Indian
tribes, thus, excluding marks used in interstate commerce. See id. § 1.
34 See the 1905 Act § 9 (vesting in the D.C. Circuit appellate jurisdiction over
decisions of the USPTO Commissioner of Patents).
1 46 App. D.C. 52 (D.C. Cir. 1917).
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not be descriptive to a large percentage of consumers and therefore
was registrable.3 6  The court, however, held that if a word is
descriptive, it may not be registered, even if a large percentage of
consumers would not consider it so." To further illustrate its
point, the court extended its analysis to the use of descriptive
words in foreign languages, and marked the first time a USPTO
primary reviewing court" recognized the doctrine of foreign
equivalents, albeit in dicta:
A descriptive word in a foreign language, though meaningless to the
public generally, would fall within the statute, since it is the real
signification of the word or device, and not the idea which it may, or
may not, convey to the general public, which brings it within the
[descriptiveness bar of the 1905 Act].
In 1929, Congress renamed the United States Court of Customs
Appeals to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(the "C.C.P.A.") and vested in it the D.C. Circuit's former USPTO
36 Id. at 54. Unlike the Lanham Act, under the 1905 Act, only fanciful and
arbitrary marks were capable of registration. See Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad
Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S. 446, 453 (1911) ("[N]o one can appropriate as a
trademark a generic name or one descriptive of an article of trade, its qualities,
ingredients, or characteristics, or any sign, word, or symbol which, from the
nature of the fact it is used to signify, others may employ with equal truth."
(quoting Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co. v. Standard Paint Co., 163 F. 977, 979 (8th
Cir. 1908))); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 5:3 (stating that, under the 1905 Act,
"[o]nly 'technical common-law trademarks' could be registered. That is, only
purely fanciful and arbitrary, not descriptive, marks could be registered.").
3 7 Hercules Powder, 46 App. D.C. at 54.
38 The term "primary reviewing court" refers to the D.C. Circuit, the C.C.P.A.
or the Federal Circuit in their respective periods of USPTO appellate
jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Pharmavite LLC, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1778, 1780
(T.T.A.B. 2009) (referring to the Federal Circuit as the T.T.A.B.'s "primary
reviewing court"); In re Parkway Mach. Corp., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201,
1205 (T.T.A.B. 1999) (referring to the former C.C.P.A. as the T.T.A.B.'s
"primary reviewing court"). Decisions of the Patent Office may also be
reviewed by district courts. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) (2006); 3 MCCARTHY,
supra note 3, § 21:20.
39 Id. Shortly thereafter, the D.C. Circuit decided its first true foreign
equivalents case. In In re Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 46 App. D.C. 512 (D.C. Cir.
1917), the court relied on Hercules Powder to hold that the French word
"E'clatant," meaning "brilliant, shining, glittering," was descriptive of goods
with a satin finish. Id. at 313, 315.
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appellate jurisdiction.4 The C.C.P.A. first addressed the issue of
foreign equivalents in the highly influential case of In re Northern
Paper Mills,41 in which the court discussed whether a foreign word
could be descriptive despite the fact that "the English language is
the language of the people" of this country.42 The C.C.P.A.
surveyed the state of foreign equivalents law and held that the
doctrine applies.43 Northern Paper Mills also added an important
exception to the doctrine-that it only applies to the "modem
languages of the principal nations of the world.""
Although the doctrine has been a part of trademark law for well
over a century, most of its confusing exceptions and nuances have
been developed over the past several decades by the Federal
Circuit and the Patent Office's trademark tribunal, the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board (the "T.T.A.B." or the "Board").45
40 See Act of March 2, 1929, ch. 488, 45 Stat. 1475, 1475.
41' 64 F.2d 998 (C.C.P.A. 1933), cited with approval in In re Spirits Int'l,
N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
42 Id. at 998.
43 Id. Northern Paper Mills relies on Judge Learned Hand's decision in Coty,
Inc., v. Le Blume Imp. Co., 292 F. 264 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 293 F. 344 (2d Cir.
1923), for the proposition that "[a] foreign word used in the country of its origin,
in a descriptive way, cannot be used as a trade-mark in this country." N. Paper
Mills, 64 F.2d at 999. Coty, however, stands for the opposite proposition. See
Coty, 292 F. at 267 ("In [other] countries the name would be generic and no
maker could monopolize it, but its meaning there does not affect its meaning
here."). On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with Judge Hand and rejected the
doctrine. See Coty, 292 F. at 358-59 ("[A] word which is not in general or
common use, and is unintelligible and non-descriptive to the general public,
although it may be known to linguists and scientists, may properly be regarded
as arbitrary and fanciful, and capable of being used as a trade-mark."). The
Second Circuit's rejection of the doctrine was recognized by the Fourth Circuit
in Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1531 n.7 (4th Cir. 1984)
(quoting Coty, 292 F. at 358-59).
44N. Paper Mills, 64 F.2d at 999.
45 Prior to 1958, the Commissioner of Patents of the USPTO heard appeals of
final decisions of trademark Examiners. See the 1905 Act, ch. 592, § 8, 33 Stat.
at 726-27. On August 8, 1958, Congress created the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board (the "T.T.A.B." or the "Board"), which decides inter partes
proceedings in the first instance as well as appeals from trademark examiners.
See Act of Jan. 7, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-609, 72 Stat. 540, 540.
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III. THE MODERN DOCTRINE
A. In General
During the second half of the twentieth century, the doctrine of
foreign equivalents was developed in the Federal Circuit4 6 on
appeal from refusals of registration and inter partes proceedings in
the USPTO,47 as well as in the T.T.A.B.48 The doctrine is, in
almost every respect, poorly reasoned, confusing, and
inconsistently applied.
The leading foreign equivalents case, often cited by the Patent
Office and district courts,49 is Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772.0 In Palm Bay, the
Federal Circuit summarized the doctrine as follows: "Under the
doctrine of foreign equivalents, foreign words from common
46 In 1982, Congress established the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which acquired the jurisdiction of the C.C.P.A. See The Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. In its first opinion,
the Federal Circuit held that decisions of its predecessor, the C.C.P.A., are
binding precedent. See S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 1982) (en banc).
47 See, e.g., In re Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(appeal from ex parte refusal to register); Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (appeal from inter partes proceeding).
48 Although district courts and regional circuits have applied the doctrine,
these courts generally defer to the Federal Circuit and the T.T.A.B. For
example, in Sutter Home Winery, Inc. v. Madrona Vineyards, L.P., No. C 05-
0587 MHP, 2005 WL 701599 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2005), the Northern District
of California noted that although "[t]he Ninth Circuit has yet to opine on the
applicability of the doctrine of foreign equivalents . . . . the doctrine is well-
established in trademark registration proceedings." Id. at *6 (citing Palm Bay,
396 F.3d at 1377; In re Consol. Cigar Corp., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1484
(T.T.A.B. 1989); In re Am. Safety Razor Co., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1459, 1460
(T.T.A.B. 1987)).
49 See, e.g., RE/MAX Int'l, Inc. v. Trendsetter Realty, LLC, 655 F. Supp. 2d
679, 714 n.14 (S.D. Tex. 2009); Habeeba's Dance of the Arts, Ltd. v.
Knoblauch, 430 F. Supp. 2d 709, 716 (S.D. Ohio 2006); In re Unidos Fin.
Servs., Inc., No. 77126814, 2010 WL 667922, at *3 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 27, 2010); In
re Le Chateau De Ma Mere, Societe Anonyme, No. 78624761, 2010 WL
3597250, at *3 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 3, 2010).
5o 396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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languages are translated into English to determine the genericness,
descriptiveness, as well as similarity of connotation in order to
ascertain confusing similarity with English word marks."" The
Federal Circuit also explained the circumstances in which the
doctrine should be applied. Relying on an influential T.T.A.B.
decision, In re Pan Tex Hotel Corp.," the court explained that the
doctrine should only be applied "when it is likely that the ordinary
American purchaser would 'stop and translate [the word] into its
English equivalent.""' The Palm Bay court, however, neither
defined "ordinary American purchaser," nor explained the
circumstances in which such a purchaser would translate the
foreign mark.54
B. The Common Language Requirement
As mentioned above, the doctrine only applies in cases in
which the foreign language is "common."" The doctrine does not
apply to "obsolete, dead, or obscure languages."56
51 Id. at 1377 (citing In re Sarkli, Ltd., 721 F.2d 353 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re
Am. Safety Razor Co., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1460). Although the Federal Circuit only
mentioned likelihood of confusion and distinctiveness, the doctrine applies to
other bars. See, e.g., In re Manufactura de Tabacos (Matasa) S.A., No.
07/090,638, 1999 WL 320873, at *3 (T.T.A.B. May 12, 1999) (applying the
doctrine in the primarily geographically descriptive bar context).
52 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 109, 110 (T.T.A.B. 1976).
5 Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1377 (alteration in original) (citing Pan Tex Hotel,
190 U.S.P.Q. at 110).
54 Id.
55Id. ("Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, foreign words from common
languages are translated into English. . . .").
56 Enrique Bernat F., S.A. v. Guadalajara, Inc. 210 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir.
2000) (citing 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:34 (4th ed. 1999)); see 3 Louis ALTMAN & MALLA
POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 18:16 (4th ed. 2010) ("[W]ords which trace their ancestry to
Latin, Greek or archaic Anglo-Saxon roots, and are not in common use ... are
fanciful."). Judge Augustus Hand, writing for the Second Circuit, explained
that, for the purposes of the doctrine, a foreign mark in Spanish "stands on quite
a different footing from words taken from the language of Hottentots or
Patagonians which might be so unfamiliar as to be in effect fanciful or arbitrary
terms." McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles H. Phillips Chem. Co., 53 F.2d
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Notwithstanding this rule, the Patent Office applies the
doctrine to some very uncommon languages. Perhaps the most
egregious example of this is the doctrine's application to
Esperanto, a rarely used language invented in Poland in the late
nineteenth century. Another example is Afrikaans, which is
spoken by a mere 0.007% of Americans." The doctrine's common
language requirement in theory protects the rights of would-be
registrants by barring application of the doctrine to marks in
obscure languages. In reality, however, courts and the Patent
Office have arbitrarily chosen which languages are considered
"common." Thus, would-be registrants cannot anticipate the
languages to which the doctrine will apply, causing significant
confusion.
C. Words with Multiple Meanings-"Exact" Translations
Required
The Federal Circuit has held that, under the doctrine, foreign
and English marks are only considered equivalents where they are
exact, unambiguous equivalents of each other.59 The T.T.A.B. has
1011, 1011 (2d Cir. 1931).
Other languages excluded from the doctrine include the Taino Language of
the Indians of the Dominican Republic, Gen. Cigar Co., Inc. v. G.D.M. Inc., 988
F. Supp. 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), the Native American Miwok tribal language, In
re Spirits of New Merced, LLC, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1618 (T.T.A.B.
2007), and the language of the Choctaw Native Americans, Dadirrian v.
Theodorian, 37 N.Y.S. 611, 612 (N.Y. Sup. 1895).
s7 See Ex parte Sanitary Knitting Co., 1911 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 220, 221; THE
WORLD ALMANAC & ENCYCLOPEDIA 1908, 530 (1907), available at
http://books.google.com/ (search for "the world almanac" and "esperanto" and
choose selection subtitled "Facts on File, Inc.-1907"). It was "almost
unknown in the United States until 1905." Id.
58 See U.S. Census Bureau, Detailed Languages Spoken at Home and Ability
to Speak English for the Population 5 Years and Over for the United States:
2006-2008, CENSUS.GOV (Apr. 2010), http://www.census.gov/population/www/
socdemo/language/detailed-lang-tables.xls.
5 See In re Sarkli, Ltd., 721 F.2d 353, 354-55 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The applicant
in Sarkli attempted to register the French mark "repichage." Id. at 353. The
examiner and the T.T.A.B. applied the doctrine and refused registration based
on a likelihood of confusion with the previously registered "second chance"
mark. Id. On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that "repichage" translates to,
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interpreted this ruling to stand for the proposition that words are
not foreign equivalents where a foreign word has multiple English
meanings.o In developing this element of the doctrine, however,
neither the Board nor the Federal Circuit has attempted to explain
why a consumer who speaks both English and a foreign language
would not be confused if the foreign word has multiple English
meanings. Indeed, the Board did not attempt to explain why a
foreign language speaker would not be confused between a foreign
word and all of its English equivalents.
D. The Heart of the Doctrine-The Likelihood of Translation
Requirement
The likelihood of translation requirement-that an ordinary
purchaser "stop and translate" the foreign mark-is the threshold
requirement for application of the doctrine.' Neither the Federal
among other things, "reprieve," and "make up or second chance examination" in
the academic world. Id. at 354. The court explained that although "[e]ach of
these meanings in a broad sense connotes giving a second chance[,] . . . this is
not the same as saying that 'repechage' is equivalent to 'second chance."' Id.
The court in Sarkli held that marks, under the doctrine, must be exact
equivalents. Id. at 354-55. The court noted, however, that marks may not have
to be exact synonyms if they are similar in sight and sound. Id.
60 In re OpBiz, No. 77055011, 2009 WL 873127, at *6 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 19,
2009) (citing In re Buckner, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1316, 1317 (T.T.A.B. 1987)).
In OpBiz, the applicant attempted to register the mark "heart." Id. at * 1. The
examiner, applying the doctrine, refused registration on the ground that "heart"
is confusingly similar to the registered trademark "kokoro," the Japanese word
for heart. Id. at *1-2 (citation omitted). On appeal to the T.T.A.B., the
examining attorney argued that "heart" and "kokoro" are foreign equivalents,
relying on a listing from a Japanese-English dictionary as well as the translation
statement from the "kokoro" registration. Id. at *2. The applicant argued,
however, that "the Japanese word 'kokoro' has multiple English meanings
besides 'heart,' including 'mind,' 'spirit,' 'mentality,' 'thought,' 'will' and
'intention."' Id. at *3. The T.T.A.B. agreed with the applicant and concluded
that the "Japanese term has multiple English translations, only one of which is
'heart.' While the translations may be somewhat similar, they are not exact.
Based on the dictionary evidence, we agree with applicant that 'kokoro' has a
broader meaning than just 'heart,' thereby rendering the two words not foreign
equivalents." Id at *6.
61 See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En
1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also In re Optica Int'l, 196
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Circuit nor the T.T.A.B. has explained the exact criteria to
determine whether a mark is unlikely to be translated. However,
case law has recognized the following instances in which a
consumer would be unlikely to translate a foreign mark: (1) foreign
words which have entered the English vernacular; (2)
grammatically incorrect foreign phrases; (3) marks on canned
goods; and (4) goods encountered in an environment associated
with the relevant foreign culture.
1. Foreign Words Which Have Entered the English Vernacular
Perhaps the most commonly recognized instance of unlikely
translation is a foreign mark which has entered the English
vernacular. The leading case on the matter is Continental Nut Co.
v. Le Cordon Bleu,62 in which the court examined whether "Cordon
Bleu" was the equivalent of its literal French translation, "Blue
Ribbon."63 The court, agreeing with the T.T.A.B., explained that
"[t]he French term is not so unusual to the American public
because it is defined in American Dictionaries."' Indeed, English
dictionaries define the term as "a person regarded as entitled to a
badge of eminent distinction; specif., a first class cook, particularly
a woman cook."65 Therefore, despite their literal equivalence, the
marks "would not have the same significance to the American
public," since "'BLUE RIBBON' and 'CORDON BLEU' create
different commercial impressions."66 For this reason, the Federal
Circuit held the doctrine inapplicable where the word has entered
the English vernacular and changed meanings.6
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 775, 777 (T.T.A.B. 1977) (citing Le Cordon Bleu, S.A.R.L. v.
Cont'l Nut Co., 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 734 (T.T.A.B. 1973) ("Cont'l Nut 1"),
aff'd, 494 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1974)); In re Pan Tex Hotel Corp., 190 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 109, 110 (T.T.A.B. 1976)); In re Tia Maria, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
524, 525-26 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
62 494 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ("Cont'l Nut Il"); see also Cont'l Nut Co. v.
Le Cordon Bleu, 494 F.2d 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ("Cont'l Nut lI").
63 Continental Nut II, 494 F.2d at 1396.
64Id. (quoting Cont'l Nut !, 177 U.S.P.Q. at 735).
6 5 Id. (quoting Cont'l Nut 1, 177 U.S.P.Q. at 735).66 Id. (quoting Cont'lNut!, 177 U.S.P.Q. at 735).
67 Id. at 1396 n.6 ("Such a finding precludes application of the doctrine of
foreign equivalents." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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However, the court did not explain why an American purchaser
fluent in a foreign language would fail to translate a foreign mark
even if it has a second non-literal meaning in English. For
example, many foreign language speakers who are not native
English speakers may be unaware of English idioms and may, for
this reason, translate foreign marks literally.
2. Grammatically Incorrect Phrases
The Board has also noted that consumers may not "stop and
translate" a grammatically incorrect foreign phrase." In In re
Trimarchi,69 the applicants attempted to register a French mark
"Allez Filles!" and provided the literal translation "go girls!""o The
examiner refused registration on the ground of confusing similarity
with the previously registered "go girl" mark." In reversing the
examiner's decision, the T.T.A.B. held that "it is not clear that
French speakers would even stop and translate this phrase because
it is grammatically incorrect and they may simply 'take it as it
is. '"72
The Board, however, gave absolutely no reason why a French
speaker would not translate two very simple words even if they are
grammatically incorrect. This rule is also confusing in that it does
not provide a clear standard-there is no indication of whether all
grammatically incorrect phrases would be excepted from
translation or where the bar would be set.
3. Marks on Canned Goods
The T.T.A.B. has held that a consumer is not likely to translate
a foreign mark where the mark is on a canned food label. In the
oft-cited In re Tia Maria, Inc.7 1 case, the applicant attempted to
68 In re Trimarchi, No. 77222086, 2009 WL 1692509, at *3 (T.T.A.B. May
14, 2009).
69 No. 77222086, 2009 WL 1692509 (T.T.A.B. May 14, 2009).
70 Id. at *4.
n' Id. at *2.
72 Id. at *6 (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
7 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 524 (T.T.A.B. 1975), cited with approval in In re
Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at
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register "Tia Maria" for restaurant services.7 4  The examiner
refused registration based on a likelihood of confusion with the
registered mark "Aunt Mary's," for canned fruits and vegetables.7 1
The Board reversed the examiner, holding that despite the literal
equivalence of the "Tia Maria" and "Aunt Mary's" marks, there
are foreign marks which "even those familiar with the language
will not translate, accepting the term as it is, and situations arise in
the marketplace which make it unfeasible or even unlikely that
purchasers will translate the brand names or labels appearing on
canned foods and other like products."76
The Board did not explain why a purchaser would not translate
brand names or labels on canned foods. Nor did it explain exactly
what a "like product" is. Would-be registrants, therefore, are left
to guess as to when something is similar enough to a label
appearing on canned food so as to make the doctrine of foreign
equivalents inapplicable.
4. Goods Encountered in an Environment Associated with the
Relevant Foreign Culture
In Tia Maria, the Board also implied that a purchaser is
unlikely to translate a foreign mark where the environment in
which he encounters the mark is saturated with d6cor associated
with the foreign language.n The Board explained that "upon
dining at the 'TIA MARIA' restaurant in Mexican decor and
surrounded by a menu of Mexican delicacies," it is unlikely that a
purchaser would translate the mark." The Board, again, gave no
reasoning as to why someone fluent in English and a foreign
language would not translate the foreign mark simply because of
the type of restaurant in which they encounter the mark. It is thus
difficult for a would-be registrant to predict whether the context in
1377; In re Thomas, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1021, 1025-27 (T.T.A.B. 2006); In
re Am. Safety Razor Co., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1459, 1459 (T.T.A.B. 1987).
74 1n re Tia Maria, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 524, 525 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
" Id. at 525.
76Id. at 525-26 (emphasis added).
n Id. at 526.
78 Id
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which his mark is used would make it unlikely for it to be
translated.
In sum, neither the Board nor the Federal Circuit have
delineated exactly in which cases an American consumer would
refuse to translate a mark, taking it as is. Further, both the Board
and the Federal Circuit have failed to provide any reasoning as to
why a foreign language speaking consumer would not translate a
mark in any of their cases. This complete lack of guidance forces
the would-be registrant to guess whether the doctrine will be
applied in their case and undermines the predictability which is
critical to the trademark system.
E. Burden ofProof
The Federal Circuit and the regional circuits have yet to
squarely consider whether the burden of proof of likelihood of
translation-the threshold limitation to application of the doctrine
of foreign equivalents-falls on the party attempting to use the
doctrine or the party against whom it is used. However, the
Federal Circuit has implied, without discussion, that the applicant
has the burden of proving that a consumer who speaks the foreign
language would not translate the mark.79 In In re Spirits
International, N Vo, the Federal Circuit explained that since the
"applicant does not contend that the specific context of the mark is
such that an ordinary American purchaser sufficiently familiar with
Russian would nonetheless take the mark at face value," the
doctrine applies."' The T.T.A.B. has also failed to consider the
issue directly. However, in practice, the Board requires the
applicant to prove a lack of likelihood of translation.8 2 In contrast,
79 In re Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
so 563 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
81 Id. (emphasis added).
82 See e.g., In re La Peregrina Ltd., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1645, 1648
(T.T.A.B. 2008). Although the Board in Peregrina did not explicitly explain
which party bears the burden of proof, it held that because "[t]here is no
compelling evidence in the record to establish that the mark would not be
translated," the doctrine applies. Id. This, of course, implies that, in an exparte
proceeding, the burden is on the applicant to prove that a consumer would not
translate the foreign mark.
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several district courts have considered the issue and, unlike the
T.T.A.B., concluded that the proponent of the doctrine bears the
burden of proof.8 3 A New Jersey district court held that since the
party attempting to use the doctrine of foreign equivalents has
"offered no evidence to support an inference that U.S. consumers
are likely to translate the mark[,] . . . the predicate condition for
application of the doctrine of foreign equivalents has not been
satisfied," and thus, the doctrine does not apply.84 Similarly, an
Ohio district court noted "some doubts about whether the ordinary
American purchaser would stop and translate [the foreign mark]
into its English equivalent," and that "[d]iscovery is needed to test
the [proponent of the doctrine's] argument on this issue."
Neither the Federal Circuit, the T.T.A.B., nor any regional
circuit has squarely addressed who has the burden of proving
likelihood of translation-the threshold to application of the
doctrine of foreign equivalents. This is yet another point of
confusion and unpredictability in the doctrine.
IV. THE ORDINARY AMERICAN PURCHASER AND INRE SPIRITS
INTERNATIONAL
As discussed, the doctrine is only applied when the "ordinary
American purchaser" would likely translate the mark into
English." However, what seems to be a relatively straightforward
rule becomes murky when one considers the definition of
"ordinary American purchaser." The Federal Circuit recently
attempted to clarify this important point in In re Spirits
International but only created more uncertainty in the T.T.A.B.
and the trademark world in general.
83 See Habeeba's Dance of the Arts, Ltd. v. Knoblauch, 430 F. Supp. 2d 709,
716 (S.D. Ohio 2006); Lazzaroni USA Corp. v. Steiner Foods, No. Civ. 05-4476
(JAG), 2006 WL 932345, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 11, 2006).
84 See Lazzaroni, 2006 WL 932345, at *4.
85 Habeeba's Dance of the Arts, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
86 Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772,
396 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (citing In re Pan
Tex Hotel Corp., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 109, 110 (T.T.A.B. 1976)).
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A. In re Thomas: The Ordinary American Purchaser in the
TT.A.B.
In the seminal foreign equivalents case, Palm Bay, the Federal
Circuit held that the doctrine of foreign equivalents should only be
applied "when it is likely that the ordinary American purchaser
would stop and translate the word into its English equivalent.""
The court, however, never defined "ordinary American purchaser."
Shortly after Palm Bay was decided, the T.T.A.B. purported to
define "ordinary American purchaser" in In re Thomas." In
Thomas, the applicant attempted to register the French mark,
"marche noir," meaning "black market."" The applicant argued
that the doctrine of foreign equivalents should not apply because
only 0.6% of the U.S. population speaks French, making it unlikely
that the average American consumer would translate the mark.o
Disagreeing with the applicant, the Board noted that according
to a leading trademark treatise, "[t]he test is whether, to those
American buyers familiar with the foreign language, the word
would denote its English equivalent."" It explained that although
"the doctrine is not an absolute rule . . . the applicant's
interpretation of it would write the doctrine out of existence."92
The Thomas Board held that "[t]he 'ordinary American purchaser'
in this context refers to the ordinary American purchaser who is
knowledgeable in the foreign language."9 3 In subsequent cases, the
T.T.A.B. has consistently applied the Thomas definition of
"ordinary American purchaser" to include only those purchasers
familiar with both English and the foreign language at issue.94
" Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1377 (emphasis added) (quoting Pan Tex Hotel, 190
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 110) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
8 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1021 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
' 9 Id at 1024.
90 Id.
9' Id (emphasis added) (quoting 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:26 (4th ed. 2006)).
92 Id.
93 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Nestle's Milk Prods., Inc. v. Baker Importing
Co., Inc., 182 F.2d 193 (C.C.P.A. 1950); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 91, § 23:26).
94 See, e.g., In re La Peregrina Ltd., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1645, 1647-48
(T.T.A.B. 2008); In re OpBiz, LLC, No. 77055011, 2009 WL 873127, at *5
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B. In re Spirits International: Thomas Abrogated and the
Doctrine Partially Abolished
The Federal Circuit's recent In re Spirits International decision
seemed to abrogate Thomas and at least partially abolish the
doctrine-but not without creating the usual confusion associated
with the doctrine's application." In Spirits, the applicant
attempted to register the Russian language mark "Moskovskaya,"
meaning "of or from Moscow," for vodka." The T.T.A.B.
affirmed the examiner's refusal of registration under subsection
(2)(e)(3) of the Lanham Act" for being primarily geographically
deceptively misdescriptive98 of the goods, since the vodka was not
(T.T.A.B. Mar. 19, 2009); In re Manuel Jacinto, LDA, No. 78905244, 2008 WL
4674597, at *3 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 29, 2008).
95 See Elizabeth J. Rest, Lost in Translation: A Critical Examination of
Conflicting Decisions Applying the Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents, 96
TRADEMARK REP. 1211, 1211 (2006) (noting that courts have reached
"irreconcilable holdings" in applying the doctrine); John L. Welch, TTAB
Clarifies Doctrine of Equivalents, Affirms 2(e)(3) Refusal of "MOSKOVSKA YA"
for Vodka, THE TTABLOG (Feb. 19, 2008),
http://thettablog.blogspot.com/2008/02/precedential-no-6-ttab-clarifies.html
("Palm Bay [was] more confusing than enlightening.").
9In re Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
97 "[T]he Lanham Act is the paramount source of trademark law in the United
States, as interpreted almost exclusively by the federal courts." Two Pesos, Inc.
v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 n.16 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Trademark Review Commission, 77
TRADEMARK REP. 375, 377 (1987)). Under the Lanham Act, a mark's
registration on the principal register is "prima facie evidence of the validity of
the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the owner's ownership
of the mark, and of the owner's exclusive right to use the registered mark." 15
U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2006); see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 19:9
(discussing advantages of registration).
98 This bar prevents registration of marks that deceive consumers as to the
geographic source of the goods. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 14:31.
Specifically:
the PTO must deny registration under [15 U.S.C.] § 1052(e)(3) if (1)
the primary significance of the mark is a generally known geographic
location, (2) the consuming public is likely to believe the place
identified by the mark indicates the origin of the goods bearing the
mark, when in fact the goods do not come from that place, and (3) the
misrepresentation was a material factor in the consumer's decision.
In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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actually from Moscow. 99
The applicant's primary argument to the Federal Circuit on
appeal was that Thomas and its progeny misinterpreted the Federal
Circuit's "ordinary American purchaser" language in Palm Bay.'o
Specifically, the applicant argued that "the Board erroneously held
that [a mark must be considered] from the perspective of
consumers of vodka who speak the foreign language, not of vodka
consumers in general," as required by Federal Circuit precedent."'
The court agreed with the applicant and abrogated Thomas,
holding that "[t]he 'ordinary American purchaser' . . . includes all
American purchasers, including those proficient in a non-English
language who would ordinarily be expected to translate words into
English."'O2 In other words, the relevant purchaser is simply the
ordinary purchaser of the goods, irrespective of whether he speaks
the relevant foreign language."o
Later in the opinion, however, the Federal Circuit applied the
threshold limitation to the doctrine-the likelihood of translation
analysis. The court held that the doctrine applied, since "in this
9 Cal. Innovations, 329 F.3d at 1350-51; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3) (2006).
100 Brief of Appellant at 10-15, In re Spirits International N.V., 563 F.3d 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 2008-1369), 2008 WL 2967606. Commentators have also
criticized Thomas' holding as being in tension with Palm Bay. See Jordan S.
Weinstein, Ex Parte Cases, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 17, 34 (2009) ("[Ilt is difficult
to reconcile how In re Thomas and Palm Bay Imports apply the foreign
equivalents doctrine."); John L. Welch, TTAB Attempts to Clarify Doctrine of
Foreign Equivalents in Affirming 2(d) Refusal of "MARCHE NOIR," THE
TTABLOG (May 3, 2006), http://thettablog.blogspot.com/2006/05/citable-no-25-
ttab-attempts-to-clarify.html ("Is the Board's ruling [in In re Thomas] at odds
with Palm Bay when it says that the 'ordinary American purchaser' means
someone knowledgeable in French? [In Palm Bay, t]he CAFC and the TTAB
seemed to say that the average American purchaser would be unlikely to
translate VEUVE into 'widow' because he or she is unlikely to be aware of the
French word. In other words, the average American purchaser does not know
French.").
101 Brief of Appellant, supra note 100, at 9-10.
102 Spirits, 563 F.3d at 1352 (emphasis added).
103 See id.; see also Anthony L. Fletcher and Steven M. Weinberg, The Thirty-
Eighth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 75
TRADEMARK REP. 573, 590 n.103 (1985) ("[T]he focus [of the doctrine of
foreign equivalents] should be on the public to whom the product is marketed.").
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case the applicant does not contend that the specific context of the
mark is such that an ordinary American purchaser sufficiently
familiar with Russian would nonetheless take the mark at face
value." 04 The court appeared to use the Thomas definition of
"ordinary American purchaser," despite repudiating it earlier in the
opinion."' Even though the court held that the doctrine of foreign
equivalents applies, the court did not utilize the English equivalent
of the mark as required under the doctrine. Instead, the court-
without explanation-treated the mark as foreign throughout the
rest of the opinion.'06
After finding the doctrine applicable, the court explained that
"[o]nce the word or phrase is translated [under the doctrine of
foreign equivalents], its impact must be 'material' under
subsection 2(e)(3). The question here is the scope of the
materiality requirement."'O7 The court held that subsection 2(e)(3)
of the Lanham Act, embodies a requirement that "a substantial
portion of the relevant consumers is likely to be deceived, not
whether any absolute number or particular segment of the relevant
consumers (such as foreign language speakers) is likely to be
deceived."' 8
The Spirits court's holding essentially disavowed any use of
the doctrine, since consumers who do not speak the foreign
language would generally be unable to translate the foreign mark,
and thus the doctrine would not apply.'" Spirits is, therefore,
104 Spirits, 563 F.3d at 1352 (emphasis added).
10 See id.
'0 6 See id. at 1352-57.
107 Id. at 1352; see In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2003) ("[T]he PTO must deny registration under § 1052(e)(3) if (1) the primary
significance of the mark is a generally known geographic location, (2) the
consuming public is likely to believe the place identified by the mark indicates
the origin of the goods bearing the mark, when in fact the goods do not come
from that place, and (3) the misrepresentation was a material factor in the
consumer's decision.").
10 Spirits, 563 F.3d at 1353 (emphasis added).
109 See In re Thomas, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1021, 1024 (T.T.A.B. 2006)
(recognizing that an interpretation of the Federal Circuit's "ordinary American
purchaser" language which includes purchasers who do not understand the
foreign language "would write the doctrine out of existence" (citing Palm Bay
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completely incompatible with Thomas, which held that the
doctrine is applicable "despite the fact that [a mark] may be
meaningless to the public generally."'
The court in Spirits criticized the Board for applying the
doctrine and "reject[ing] a requirement of proportionality,""' that
is, the requirement that a substantial percentage of the relevant
consuming public be deceived."' The court vacated the Board's
decision because the Board failed to consider whether Russian
speakers were a "substantial portion of the intended audience.""'
The court noted that a mere 0.25% of the U.S. population speaks
Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d
1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005))).
Note, Spanish speakers, who constitute approximately 12% of the population,
may be considered a "substantial portion" under Spirits. See infra notes 178-
180, 188 and accompanying text. However, Spirits does not consider the
likelihood that some foreign language speakers would not be confused.
Moreover, a large percentage of Spanish speakers in the United States do not
speak English very well and thus would not be confused between a Spanish and
English mark. See infra Part VI.B.1.a.ii. Hence, even if the proportion of
Spanish speakers is "substantial," the combination of these two factors would
likely lower the proportion of consumers likely to be confused by a Spanish
language mark to an insubstantial portion of the public.
Aside from Spanish, no foreign language is spoken by Americans at a rate of
greater than 1% of the population, which would certainly not be considered a
"substantial portion" under Spirits. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 58. 1
note that Census data only considers people who speak the foreign language at
home, not in general. Although there appears to be no data regarding the
percentage of Americans who speak each foreign language without speaking it
at home, any difference this might make is ignored by the Patent Office and the
courts. Indeed, the Patent Office instructs its examiners to rely on census data in
refusing registration under the doctrine of foreign equivalents. See TMEP
§ 1207.01(b)(vi)(B) (6th ed. Rev. 1, Oct. 2009). Similarly, the Federal Circuit in
Spirits also relied on this census data in a foreign equivalents context. Spirits,
563 F.3d at 1357; see also In re Tokutake Indus. Co., Ltd., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1697, 1699-1700 & n.1 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (citing U.S. Census language
statistics in foreign equivalents context).
"o Thomas, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1024 (quoting Nestle's Milk Prods., Inc. v.
Baker Importing Co., Inc., 182 F.2d 193, 196 (C.C.P.A. 1950)).
"' Spirits, 563 F.3d at 1357 (citing In re Spirits Int'l N.V., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1078, 1085 (T.T.A.B. 2008)).
112 Id. at 1356; see also infra Part VI.B. 1.a.i.
" Spirits, 536 F.3d at 1356.
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Russian, which "would not be, by any measure, a substantial
portion."" 4  The court did leave room for the possibility that
Russians may be overrepresented in the vodka consuming public
or that non-Russian speakers may nevertheless understand the
Russian mark to suggest that the vodka comes from Moscow, and
it remanded to the Board for a determination of whether there is
"material deception under the correct legal test.""'
The "correct legal test," according to Spirits, then seems to be
not to apply the doctrine of foreign equivalents, at least in cases
involving geographical deception. The Board essentially had two
choices on remand. First, if it determined that Russians are
significantly overrepresented in the vodka consuming public or
that a large percentage of the non-Russian speaking consuming
public will understand the mark to suggest that the vodka is
associated with Moscow, then the Board could have found prima
facie materiality, since a "substantial portion of the intended
audience" would be materially deceived whether or not the
doctrine is applied."' Second, if the Board determined that few
consumers other than Russian speakers would understand the
meaning of the mark, then the Board would have been required to
hold that subsection 2(e)(3) did not bar registration. In either
instance, there was no place for the doctrine of foreign equivalents
in the Board's analysis. Because the court's reasoning was not
limited to the facts of this case, but instead would apply to all
subsection 2(e)(3) cases, Spirits effectively abolished the doctrine
in cases concerning primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive marks under subsection 2(e)(3).
114 id.
11 id.
16 Id. at 1355. A prima facie case may be rebutted if the applicant can
"establish that the presumption of materiality is not, in fact, valid." Spirits, 86
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 n.20. For example, the applicant may rebut the
prima facie case by survey evidence. Id. In its vacated opinion, the Board held
that "the survey does not serve to rebut the examining attorney's prima facie
case." See id. at 1088. The Federal Circuit noted, however, that "the Board's
rejection of the survey as rebutting the prima facie case . .. was heavily
influenced by its incorrect view of materiality." Spirits, 563 F.3d at 1357.
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V. SPIRITS' AFTERMATH
A. The Board's Decision on Remand
After the remand from the Federal Circuit in Spirits, the Board
acknowledged that it applied an "incorrect test for materiality in
determining that the mark was geographically deceptive.""' The
Board recognized that the proper test is "whether a substantial
portion of the relevant consumers is likely to be deceived, not
whether any absolute number or particular segment of the relevant
consumers (such as foreign language speakers) is likely to be
deceived.""' In effect, the Board acknowledged that the doctrine
of foreign equivalents is inapplicable in subsection 2(e)(3) cases."9
Instead of analyzing the issue, however, the Board remanded to the
examiner to give him "an opportunity to apply the new test to this
case."' 20 Following the remand from the Board, the examiner
simply allowed the application without comment. 2 '
B. The Examination Procedures and the Trademark Manual of
Examining Procedure
In examining trademark applications, examiners rely on the
Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (the "TMEP").'22
Shortly after the Federal Circuit decided Spirits, the Patent Office
issued "Examination Procedures for § 2(a) and § 2(e)(3)
Deceptiveness Refusals for Geographic Marks" (the "Examination
" In re Spirits Int'l N.V., No. 74382759, at *2 (T.T.A.B. July 29, 2009),
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=74382759&pty=EXA&eno=24 (quoting
Spirits, 563 F.3d at 1349).
1'8 Id. (emphases added) (quoting Spirits, 563 F.3d at 1353).
119 See id.
120 Id. at *2-3.
121 See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Notice of Allowance, No.
74382759, Spirits International N.V. (Feb. 2, 2010),
http://tmportal.uspto.gov/external/portal/tow (search by Number 74382759; then
follow "Notice of Allowance" hyperlink).
122 "The Manual contains guidelines for Examining Attorneys and materials in
the nature of information and interpretation, and outlines the procedures which
Examining Attorneys are required or authorized to follow in the examination of
trademark applications." TMEP, foreword (6th ed. Rev. 2, May 2010).
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Procedures") 2 3 1to supplement the TMEP. The Patent Office,
relying on Spirits, explained that in a primarily geographically
deceptively misdescriptive analysis under subsection 2(e)(3),
refusal is only proper if "misdescription in the mark would affect a
substantial portion of the relevant consumers' decision to purchase
the goods/services." 2 4 Further, the Patent Office explained that-
contrary to Thomas-either: (1) the foreign words must be
"recognizable as such to consumers who do not speak the foreign
language"; or (2) consumers who speak the foreign language must
be the "target audience."125 These procedures effectively abolished
the doctrine of foreign equivalents in the Patent Office with respect
to geographic deceptiveness refusals.'26
In the likelihood of confusion 2 7 section, the TMEP now
explains, quoting Spirits, that "[t]he 'ordinary American purchaser'
includes 'all American purchasers, including those proficient in a
non-English language who would ordinarily be expected to
translate words into English."' 28 At least according to the writers
123 Examination Guide 2-09, Examination Procedures for § 2(a) and § 2(e)(3)
Deceptiveness Refusals for Geographic Marks, UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, (May 11, 2009),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/notices/examguide2-09.htm. Between
updates of the TMEP, the Patent Office issues interim examination procedures
which supplement it. See Trademarks-Manuals, Guides, Official Gazette,
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Mar. 17, 2010),
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/resources/index.jsp.
124 Examination Guide 2-09, supra note 1233 (emphasis added) (citing In re
Spirits, Int'l, N.V., No. 2008-1369, slip op. at 9 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 29, 2009)).
125 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Spirits, No. 2008-1369, slip op. at 15-16).
126 Following the publication of the Examination Procedures, the Patent Office
incorporated the procedures into the new edition of the TMEP. See TMEP
§ 1209.03 (6th ed. Rev. 1, Sept. 2009).
127 A mark may be refused registration under the likelihood of confusion bar if
it:
so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or
a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another
and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with
the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2006).
128 See TMEP § 1207.01(b)(vi)(A) (6th ed., Rev. 2, May 2010) (quoting In re
Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
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of the TMEP, which is generally followed by examiners, 129 Spirits'
definition of "ordinary American purchaser" is not only limited to
geographic deceptiveness refusals but also to refusals for
likelihood of confusion.
However, in the following section entitled "When an Ordinary
American Purchaser Would 'Stop and Translate,"' the TMEP
states that if "the English translation is 'literal and direct,' with no
contradictory evidence of other relevant meanings or shades of
meaning, then the doctrine should be applied, barring unusual
circumstances."l30 Essentially, examiners are instructed to always
apply the doctrine "barring unusual circumstances." This part of
the TMEP ignores Spirits' holding that the ordinary American
purchaser includes all purchasers, not just those familiar with the
relevant foreign language (who would generally be likely to "stop
and translate" the foreign mark).'3 Thus, in one section, the
TMEP appears to extend Spirits' reasoning to likelihood of
confusion cases making its application much less likely. In
another section, to the contrary, examiners are instructed to simply
apply the doctrine "barring unusual circumstances." This glaring
contradiction, of course, adds to the confusion associated with the
doctrine.
C. The Board's Current Approach
Several weeks after the Federal Circuit decided Spirits, the
Board discussed Spirits' impact for the first time.'32 In In re
Trimarchi, a likelihood of confusion case, the Board applied the
doctrine of foreign equivalents but noted that the Federal Circuit
"explicitly reserved judgment as to 'the scope of the doctrine of
129 See supra note 1222.
130 See TMEP § 1207.01(b)(vi)(B). The "other relevant meanings" language
appears to be a reference to the holding of In re Buckner, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1316 (T.T.A.B. 1987), and its progeny. See supra note 60 and accompanying
text.
'' See TMEP § 1207.01(b)(vi)(B). Not using Spirits' much broader
definition of the ordinary American purchaser all but guarantees that the
doctrine will be applied. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
132 See In re Trimarchi, No. 77222086, 2009 WL 1692509, at *6 n.7
(T.T.A.B. May 14, 2009).
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foreign equivalents in other contexts [than geographically
misdescriptive marks].""" The Board recognized that had the
Federal Circuit not included language in Spirits limiting its
applicability to primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive marks, the Board would have to consider "the
potential number of consumers of these general consumer products
who speak or understand French in terms of proportion to all
consumers of these goods."' 34 However, since Spirits did include
the limiting language, the Board relied on Thomas for the familiar
proposition that "[t]he 'ordinary American purchaser' in this
context refers to the ordinary American purchaser who is
knowledgeable in the foreign language," and the Board applied the
doctrine under this standard.'
Under the Board's new reasoning, when analyzing a foreign
mark for geographic deceptiveness, the Board will consider the
mark from the standpoint of the ordinary American purchaser,
including the majority of purchasers who do not speak the
pertinent foreign language.'3 6 For all other bars to registration,
however, the Board will continue to apply Thomas and only
consider the mark's effect on purchasers who speak the foreign
language.' Thus, according to the Board's apparent reasoning,
the ordinary American purchaser changes depending on the bar to
registration at issue. This interpretation is quite unreasonable
because the ordinary American purchaser does not actually change
depending on the bar to registration at issue.
The Board's new splintered approach of applying the doctrine
" Id. at *6 n.7 (quoting In re Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1356 n.5
(Fed. Cir. 2009)).
134 See id
1 Id. at *3 (quoting In re Thomas, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1021, 1024
(T.T.A.B. 2006)).
136 See id at *6 n.7.
137 See id at *3; see also In re Unidos Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 77126814, 2010
WL 667922, at *3 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 27, 2010) (applying the Thomas definition of
"ordinary American purchaser" in a likelihood of confusion rejection); Marquez
Bros. Int'l, Inc. v. Zucrum Foods, L.L.C., No. 92048266, 2009 WL 4956033, at
*3 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 11, 2009) (applying the Thomas definition of "ordinary
American purchaser" in a genericness rejection).
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of foreign equivalents to some bars but not others is completely
unreasoned and has no basis in foreign equivalents law. Indeed,
the Board has not even attempted to explain why the doctrine
would apply to some bars but not others, beyond stating summarily
that Spirits was a limited holding.' 8 For the sake of uniformity
and predictability, the Federal Circuit should extend Spirits and
abolish the doctrine at its next opportunity.
VI. THE DOCTRINE SHOULD BE ABOLISHED
Until Spirits, the Federal Circuit and its predecessors had
unwaveringly applied the doctrine of foreign equivalents for nearly
a century. I argue, however, that the doctrine should be abolished
for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court's decision in Menendez
v. Holt forecloses the doctrine's application.' Second, the
doctrine is inconsistent with the basic policy goal of trademark law
and is unworkable.140
A. The Doctrine is Contrary to Binding Supreme Court Precedent
The doctrine runs afoul of binding United States Supreme
Court precedent. Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected the
doctrine, albeit in the nineteenth century. In Holt v. Menendez,14 '
the trademark owner sued to enjoin the use of its registered mark
"La Favorita."l 42 The Circuit Court held that the trademark was
valid and infringed,143 and the alleged infringer appealed to the
Supreme Court.114
On appeal in Menendez v. Holt, the alleged infringer urged the
38 See Spirits, 563 F.3d at 1356 n.5 ("In this case we address only subsection
(e)(3) and its materiality requirement. We have no occasion here to decide the
scope of the doctrine of foreign equivalents in other contexts.").
139 See infra Part VI.A.
140 See infra Part VI.B.
14' 23 F. 869 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885), aff'd, 128 U.S. 514 (1888).
142 Id. at 869. The trademark owner also sued for money damages, which the
court held was barred due to laches. Id. at 870-71 (citing McLean v. Fleming,
96 U.S. 245 (1877)).
143 Id. at 870.
' See Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514 (1888).
FALL 2010] 187
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
Supreme Court to translate the mark prior to analyzing it for
distinctiveness, arguing that "[tihe term 'La Favorita"' is
descriptive since "[i]t indicates that it is the 'favorite' brand of [the
trademark owner]," which signifies only quality.145 The Supreme
Court rejected the alleged infringer's argument, holding that the
mark was not merely descriptive because it "did not, of course, in
itself indicate quality, for it was merely a fancy name, and in a
foreign language."'46
Although the Supreme Court could have been more explicit in
stating that the mark was fanciful because it was in a foreign
language, it is clear that the mark "The Favorite"-the English
equivalent of "La Favorita"-would not have been registrable
since it is self-laudatory and descriptive.'47 Thus, the Supreme
145 Brief of Appellants at 22, Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514 (1888) (Nos.
76, 77) (emphasis added). Note, it is proper to consider the briefs when
construing Supreme Court decisions. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579, 587-92 (1976) (plurality opinion).
146 Menendez, 128 U.S. at 520 (emphasis added). In the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the terms "fancy" and "fanciful" were interchangeable.
Compare id at 515 (declaring that the mark "consisted of the fanciful words 'La
Favorita."') with id at 520 ("[F]or it was merely a fancy name, and in a foreign
language."); see also United States v. Forty Barrels and Twenty Kegs of Coca
Cola, 241 U.S. 265, 286 n.3 (1916) ("A 'distinctive name' is a trade, arbitrary,
or fancy name.") (citation omitted); Walter Baker & Co. v. Baker, 77 F. 181,
189 (C.C. Va. 1896) (recognizing that "an arbitrary or fancy name" is not
descriptive of the quality of the good).
147 See generally Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311,
324 (1871) ("[One] has no right to the exclusive use of [marks], which have no
relation to the origin or ownership of the goods .. . but are only meant to
indicate . . . quality. He has no right to appropriate a [mark which] others may
employ with equal truth, and therefore have an equal right to employ for the
same purpose." (quoting Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sandf. 599, 606-07
(N.Y. Super. 1849)); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:17 (recognizing that self-
laudatory marks-such as "speedy," "friendly," "best," "premier," "deluxe,"
"greatest," and "number one"-are not registrable).
Indeed, the word "favorite" is considered self-laudatory and descriptive. See
Cooke & Cobb Co. v. Miller, 62 N.E. 582, 583 (N.Y. 1902) (recognizing that
the word "Favorite" is "in common use [and] is not the subject of exclusive
appropriation as a trade-mark by any one"), cited with approval in Hughes v.
Alfred H. Smith Co., 205 F. 302, 310 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding that the word
"favorite" is descriptive since it "indicate[s], in a way, a grade [of goods], that
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Court must have held the mark to be fanciful because it was in a
foreign language. Accordingly, since the Supreme Court held that
foreign language marks should not be translated, application of the
doctrine is foreclosed. Although the Federal Circuit and its
predecessors have applied the doctrine for almost a century,
Menendez plainly rejected the doctrine, and so must the Federal
Circuit.'48
1. Recognition of Menendez's Rejection of the Doctrine
Several years after the Supreme Court decided Menendez, the
Patent Office acknowledged the Court's rejection of the doctrine.
In Ex parte Lewis Pattberg & Bros.,14 the applicant attempted to
register the mark "The Favorite." In affirming the examiner's
refusal of registration, the Commissioner acknowledged that in
Menendez, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of "La Favorita,"
grade regarded with particular favor and preferred by users"), aff'd, 209 F. 37
(2d Cir. 1913); In re 800-Gifthouse, Inc., No. 75/016,128, 1999 WL 612964, at
*2 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 1999) (holding that "World's Favorite Florist" is
laudatory and merely descriptive); In re Winner Int'l Royalty Corp., No.
75/082,025, 1999 WL 149824, at *2 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 17, 1999) (finding that
"America's Favorite" is laudatory and merely descriptive); In re Wileswood,
Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 400, 404 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (acknowledging that
"America's Favorite Popcorn" is laudatory and merely descriptive).
In the period Menendez was decided, the Patent Office also refused
registration of laudatory marks, including "the favorite." See Ex parte Lewis
Pattberg & Bros., 53 Ms. Dec. 49 (Comm'r Pat. Aug. 1, 1893) (Manuscript
Decisions, Commissioner of Patents) (on file with author) (recognizing that
"'The Favorite"' comes within the Supreme Court's prohibition of marks that
"indicate the character, kind, quality and composition of the article [and] cannot
be exclusively appropriated by any one" (citing Clark, 80 U.S. at 324)); see also
Exparte Peerless Carbon Black Co., Ltd., 1897 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 791, 791-92
("The word 'peerless' is such a word as is ordinarily used by merchants in a
laudatory sense to extol their goods.... This word falls within that class of
words, such as 'incomparable,' 'sterling,' 'standard,' 'wonderful,' 'superior,'
'most excellent,' 'famous,' 'splendid,' 'unrivaled,' etc. which have been
properly refused registration.").
148 Although Menendez was decided over 120 years ago, under vertical stare
decisis, lower courts are bound to follow it irrespective of its age. See infra note
162 and accompanying text.
149 53 Ms. Dec. 49 (Comm'r Pat. Aug. 1, 1893) (Manuscript Decisions,
Commissioner of Patents) (on file with author).
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the foreign equivalent of the mark at issue.'s The Commissioner,
however, explained that the Supreme Court only held "La
Favorita" to be registrable because it was "'in a foreign language,'
thereby drawing a clear line of distinction between that case and
the present one.""' Thus, the Patent Office recognized that
Menendez stands for the proposition that marks "in a foreign
language" are fanciful.15 2
Similarly, in Ex parte Qualitas Patent Leather Corp., 153 the
applicant attempted to register "Qualitas," the Latin foreign
equivalent of "Quality."'54 The Commissioner first explained that
"quality" is generally refused registration as descriptive.'
However, citing Menendez, the Commissioner held that "courts
have frequently upheld descriptive words in a foreign language,"
and allowed the mark.156
'
5 0 Id. at *1.
'' Id. at **1-2 (quoting Menendez, 128 U.S. at 520).
152 See id.
153 131 Ms. Dec. 399, (Comm'r Pat. July 30, 1919) (Manuscript Decisions,
Commissioner of Patents), reprinted in 9 TRADEMARK REP. 517 (1919)).
154 id.
1ss Id. (citing Ex parte Brackett, Shaw & Lunt Co., 124 Ms. Dec. 215
(Comm'r Pat. Sept. 28, 1917) (Manuscript Decisions, Commissioner of Patents),
reprinted in 7 TRADEMARK REP. 601 (1917)). At least one commentator has
also recognized Menendez's rejection of the doctrine with respect to a mark's
distinctiveness. The commentator noted that Menendez "held that a foreign
language term functioned, in the U.S., as a protect[a]ble 'fanciful' or 'arbitrary'
mark." Gerard F. Rogers, Note, From Eveready to Park 'N Fly: Has a Decade
of Development for the Lanham Act Re-charged Trademark Law or Left the
Customer Without a Place to Park, 22 NEw ENG. L. REV. 165, 182 n.160 (1987)
(citing Menendez, 128 U.S. 514). Interestingly, the commentator is now Acting
Chief Administrative Trademark Judge of the T.T.A.B and author of several
opinions applying the doctrine of foreign equivalents. See, e.g., In re Andin
International Inc., No. 77142267, 2009 WL 625572 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2009)
(Rogers, J.); In re Manufactura de Tabacos (Matasa) S.A., No. 75/150,300, 1999
WL 1211685 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 1999) (Rogers, J.); Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board-About the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, UNITED STATES PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/appeal/
index.jsp (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). Judge Rogers was also on the T.T.A.B.
panel that decided Spirits. See In re Spirits Int'l N.V., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1078, 1079 (T.T.A.B. 2008).
156 Qualitas, 131 Ms. Dec. 399 (citing Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514
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Aside from these early cases, the Board and virtually all
courts'" considering the doctrine of foreign equivalents have
inexplicably failed to address the holding of Menendez. By
ignoring Supreme Court precedent and continuing to apply and
develop the doctrine, the Patent Office, the Federal Circuit and its
predecessors have created a complex and confusing body of law
that should never have existed.
2. The Scope ofMenendez
Since so few courts have addressed Menendez in a doctrine of
foreign equivalents context, its scope must be determined before its
reasoning can be properly applied. There are two ways to interpret
the scope of Menendez. A broader reading of Menendez would
prohibit translation of foreign marks to test them for any bar to
registration, recognizing the Supreme Court's total rejection of the
doctrine of foreign equivalents. A narrower reading of Menendez,
however, would limit its holding to prohibiting application of the
doctrine only when testing marks for distinctiveness, the specific
bar at issue in Menendez.
The former approach, abolishing the doctrine in its entirety, is
preferable. No court has ever held or suggested that the doctrine
should be applied to some bars but not others.' Making this
(1888)); see also Ad. Richter & Co., 135 Ms. Dec 84, (Comm'r Pat. June 5,
1920) (Manuscript Decisions, Commissioner of Patents), reprinted in 10
TRADEMARK REP. 414, 414-15 (1920) (citing Menendez, 128 U.S. 514).
157 The one modem court to briefly mention Menendez in a doctrine of foreign
equivalents context implied, without explanation, that Menendez is merely an
exception to the doctrine. See Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522,
1534 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Menendez, 128 U.S. at 520); infra note 165.
158 See Lazzaroni USA Corp. v. Steiner Foods, No. Civ. 05-4476(JAG), 2006
WL 932345, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 11, 2006) ("[C]ourts apply the doctrine of
foreign equivalents to treat words in a foreign language as if they are in
English." (citing Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardio Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005))); In re Manufactura de
Tabacos (Mastasa) S.A., No. 75/090,638, 1999 WL 320873, at *2 (T.T.A.B.
May 12, 1999) ("It is well settled that normally no distinctions can be made
between English terms and their foreign equivalents for purposes of
registrability . . . ." (citations omitted)); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 11:34,
12:41 (discussing the doctrine as it applies to distinctiveness); 4 MCCARTHY,
supra note 3, § 23:36 (discussing the doctrine as it applies to likelihood of
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distinction simply has no basis, either in law or in logic. Indeed,
there is no reason the doctrine's primary policy rationale of
protecting multilingual Americans would apply to some bars but
not others.
Construing Menendez narrowly would also lead to a
convoluted and arbitrary procedure and results. Under such a
narrow reading, the doctrine would be applied as follows. First, a
court would translate a foreign mark and test it for all the statutory
bars to registration. Second, upon translation, if a mark were
unregistrable due to lack of distinctiveness, a court would then
apply Menendez (narrowly construed), "un-translate" the mark,
and allow registration. The same procedure would apply if the
mark could only be refused registration as geographically
deceptive under Spirits. This simply cannot be what the Supreme
Court had in mind. Such a convoluted procedure would lead to
added confusion for applicants and their attorneys and increase
transaction costs. These transaction costs would then be passed
down to the consuming public. Moreover, this confusion would
lead to less predictable decision-making amongst trademark
applicants since applicants would have to predict what bars may be
at issue in order to know whether the doctrine may apply to their
mark.159
On the other hand, under the complete abrogation approach,
the process would be very straightforward. Foreign marks would
simply never be translated prior to being tested for the bars to
registration.
No court has ever held that the doctrine should apply only to
certain bars."o It is thus highly unlikely that the Court meant to
confusion). Of course, the Spirits court did limit its analysis to primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks, but the court reserved decision
with respect to other contexts. See In re Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1356
n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
159 Cf Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 920
(2010) ("Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles .... "
(quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991))).
160 See supra note 158.
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exempt from the doctrine the descriptiveness bar--one of the most
common61 grounds for refusal of registration-but apply the
doctrine to all other bars without providing any reasoning for this
difference in treatment. Hence, courts should interpret Menendez
broadly by abolishing the doctrine in its entirety.
3. Lower Courts Must Follow Menendez
Stare decisis requires that the Federal Circuit abolish the
doctrine of foreign equivalents. It is axiomatic that lower courts
are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court.'6 2 The Supreme
Court has instructed that "lower courts should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions."'6 3 Any argument that
Menendez fits within the likelihood of translation exception to the
modem foreign equivalents doctrine'"-that an American
purchaser would not stop and translate the foreign mark-must
fail.' 65
161 See, e.g., Philip J. Greene, Trademark Counsel in the Federal
Government-A Practitioner's Perspective, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 361, 381 (2004) ("[T]rademark applications are usually (at least
preliminarily) refused by a Trademark Examiner for one of two reasons: (1) the
mark is confusingly similar to a previously registered or pending mark, or (2)
the mark is merely descriptive.").
162 See generally Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam) ("[A]
precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter
how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be."). Moreover,
lower courts have a duty to follow Menendez, irrespective of the decision's
considerable age. See Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball:
Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1210-11 (1999) (recognizing that lower courts
have no power to declare Supreme Court precedent dead, irrespective of its age);
id. at 1211 ("The Supreme Court may take this position because it has the power
to resuscitate apparently dead precedent and will occasionally choose to do so."
(citation omitted)).
163 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 207 (1997) (citing Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)); see also State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("[lIt is [the Supreme] Court's prerogative alone to
overrule one of its precedents.").
16 See supra note 30 and Part III.D.
165 One court seemed to make such an argument implicitly. See Pizzeria Uno
Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1534 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Menendez
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First and foremost, a lower court may not attempt to force the
Supreme Court's holding into an exception to the modem doctrine,
because such an exception was not considered by the Menendez
court. In refusing to disregard century old, "defunct"'" but directly
applicable Supreme Court holdings, the Seventh Circuit recently
opined:
Plaintiffs say that a decision of the Supreme Court has "direct
application" only if the opinion expressly considers the line of
argument that has been offered to support a different approach. Yet
few opinions address the ground that later opinions deem sufficient to
reach a different result. If a court of appeals could disregard a
decision of the Supreme Court by identifying, and accepting, one or
another contention not expressly addressed by the Justices, the Court's
decisions could be circumvented with ease. They would bind only
judges too dim-witted to come up with a novel argument.167
Thus, it would be improper to argue that Menendez may be
reconciled with modem foreign equivalents doctrine because "it is
[unlikely] that the ordinary American purchaser would 'stop and
translate ['La Favorita'] into its English equivalent," 68 as this
would be a novel argument not considered by the Menendez Court.
Second, Menendez would not fit within the Federal Circuit's
"likelihood of translation" exception to the doctrine because it is
clear that even a purchaser who does not speak Spanish could
translate "favorita" to "favorite." Indeed, such an argument would
v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 520 (1888)). As an alternative to applying the doctrine of
foreign equivalents, the Pizzeria Uno court held that the mark at issue-
"Uno"-was registrable since it can be analogized to "La Favorita," which the
Supreme Court held to be fanciful. Id. at 1534 (quoting Menendez, 128 U.S. at
520). The Fourth Circuit, however, gave no explanation as to why "La
Favorita" is an exception to the doctrine of foreign equivalents instead of the
rule.
166 Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Chi., 567 F.3d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 2009)
(Easterbrook, C.J.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. McDonald v. Chi., 130 S.
Ct. 3020 (2010).
167 Id. at 857-58 (emphasis added); see also id at 858 ("If a court of appeals
may strike off on its own, this not only undermines the uniformity of national
law but also may compel the Justices to grant certiorari before they think the
question ripe for decision.").
168 Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En
1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
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be untenable because "favorita" is nearly identical to "favorite."
Courts have long recognized that foreign words which are very
similar to English words would be understood by consumers even
if they do not speak the foreign language.'6 9 For example, the
Second Circuit has held, "[t]here can be no doubt that the word
which is the subject of the trade-mark-thermogene-whether it
be spelled with or without the final 'e,' whether it be treated as
having an English or a French derivation, is a word descriptive of
[the goods].""' Thus, it is clear that even purchasers unfamiliar
with Spanish would likely be able to translate "favorita" to
"favorite." Consequently, Menendez forecloses application of the
doctrine, and it should therefore be abolished.
B. Policy Considerations
In addition to the Federal Circuit's duty to abolish the doctrine
of foreign equivalents under principles of stare decisis, policy
considerations also militate toward abolition of the doctrine.
Specifically, the doctrine impermissibly "protects" any group of
multilingual Americans by refusing registration to marks that may
confuse any group of foreign language speakers, even if that group
is of a negligible size. This "protection" is, unfortunately, at the
expense of the rest of the public (including other groups of
multilingual Americans), which is deprived of the ability to
distinguish goods in the marketplace through a registered
trademark."' Moreover, the doctrine is so riddled with confusion,
lack of reasoning and inconsistency that it is unworkable," 2 and
trademark law would simply be more predictable without it.
169 Thermogene Co., Ltd. v. Thermozine Co., Inc., 234 F. 69, 70 (2d Cir.
1916); In re Tricom Media Holdings, Inc., No. 76668320, 2008 WL 5417463, at
*1 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2008) (recognizing that "horas" is so similar to "hours"
that it "may even be understood by even those with limited knowledge of
Spanish"); In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, No. 78212751, 2005 WL 3395183, at
*4 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 1, 2005) ("The mere addition of the letter 'A' at the end of
the generic term "aspirin" is simply insufficient to transform [the Spanish word]
ASPIRINA into an inherently distinctive mark."), af'd, 488 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
170 Thermogene, 234 F. at 70.
"' See infra Part VI.B.1.b.
172 See infra Part VI.B.2.
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1. Protection of Multilingual Americans
a. The Doctrine Is Antithetical to a Basic Goal of Trademark Law
The principal goal of trademark law is to "protect the public's
expectation regarding the source and quality of goods."'" Indeed,
the public protection rationale has been called the "basic policy" of
trademark law.'74 Of course, protecting the public does not mean
protecting every single member thereof.' Instead, trademark law
embodies a proportionality requirement."'
i. The Doctrine Violates the Proportionality Requirement
Trademark law requires that an "appreciable" or "substantial"
number of consumers be deceived, confused or otherwise affected
by a mark in order for the relevant statutory bar to registration to
apply." The test is whether a "substantial portion" of the public is
173 Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 993 (9th Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
782 n.15 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (recognizing that a goal of trademark
law is to "protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product
bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product
which it asks for and wants to get" (quoting S. REP. NO. 1333, at 3 (1946))).
174 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imps., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) (citing Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 570-
71 (2d Cir. 1959)).
17 Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imps., Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1175 (2d Cir.
1976) ("A trademark owner need not prove that a junior user's conduct will
mislead all customers . . .
'76 See supra note 13.
1' See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97,
114 (2d Cir. 2009) (appreciable number) (citation omitted); Malletier v.
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 426 F.3d 532, 534 (2d Cir. 2005)
(substantial number); Nautilus Group, Inc. v. ICON Health and Fitness, Inc.,
372 F.3d 1330, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (appreciable number) (quoting
Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002)). The
"appreciable number" standard was first adopted by courts in the early twentieth
century. See, e.g., Guth Chocolate Co. v. Guth, 215 F. 750, 760 (D. Md. 1914),
aff'd, 224 F. 932 (4th Cir. 1915). This standard was, in turn, adopted by the
Restatement of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 728 cmt. a (1938)
("[T]he issue [in a likelihood of confusion analysis] is whether an appreciable
number of prospective purchasers of the goods or services" are confused.),
quoted with approval in Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow Warren Ltd., Inc., 137
F.2d 955, 960 (2d Cir. 1943). The similar "substantial number" standard was
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affected by the relevant bar to registration.' Although the exact
proportion of consumers to be considered "substantial" is not
statutorily defined, "[f]igures below 20% [of the public] become
problematic,"1 79 with the lowest reported figure being 8.5%.180
The doctrine violates this basic requirement of trademark law.
Under the doctrine, courts do not consider the proportion of the
public that would be confused or otherwise affected by a statutory
bar to registration."' Instead, the doctrine "presume[s] that a word
in one of the common, modem languages of the world will be
spoken or understood by an appreciable number of U.S. consumers
for the goods at issue."l82 Thus, instead of analyzing whether a
significant portion of consumers are confused or otherwise affected
by the mark at issue, the doctrine creates a legal fiction by
first used in a trademark infringement context in Swarthmore Classics, Inc. v.
Swarthmore Junior, 81 F. Supp. 917, 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
178 In re Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("[I]t is clear
that section (e)(3)-like subsection (a), the false advertising provision of the
Lanham Act, and the common law-requires that a significant portion of the
relevant consuming public be deceived."); see also Entrepreneur Media, 279
F.3d at 1151 (stating that in a likelihood of confusion analysis, the court must
consider whether an "appreciable number," which is equivalent to "a significant
portion of the general public," are likely to be confused (citing Kendall-Jackson
Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1052 (9th Cir.1998); Int'l
Ass'n. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr.,
103 F.3d 196, 201 (1st Cir. 1996))); In re Zuffa, LLC, No. 76/273,529, 2003
WL 22055674, at *6 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 29, 2003) (acknowledging that a mark is
descriptive if a "significant portion" of the purchasing public would consider it
so); supra note 13 and accompanying text.
1796 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 32:188.
180 See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons,
365 F. Supp. 707, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), modified, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
However, 8.5% was only "found to be 'strong evidence' of a likelihood of
confusion where other evidence was also strongly supportive." 6 MCCARTHY,
supra note 3, § 32:188 (emphasis added).
181 See generally In re Thomas, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1021, 1024 (T.T.A.B.
2006) ("Foreign language words, not adopted into the English language, which
are descriptive of a product, are so considered in registration proceedings despite
the fact that the words may be meaningless to the public generally." (emphasis
added) (quoting Nestle's Milk Prods., Inc. v. Baker Imp. Co., Inc., 182 F.2d 193,
196 (C.C.P.A. 1950))).
182 In re La Peregrina Ltd., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1645, 1648 (T.T.A.B.
2008).
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presuming that all common, modem languages are spoken by an
appreciable number of American consumers."I
This presumption violates the proportionality requirement by
ignoring the proportion of consumers who would be able to
understand, and thus be able to translate (and be confused or
deceived by) the foreign mark. The doctrine has been applied to
languages that come nowhere close to meeting the proportionality
requirement. For example, the Board has applied the doctrine to
the Afrikaans language,184 which is spoken by a mere 0.007% of
American consumers.' Even relatively common languages such
as French (spoken by 0.5% of U.S. residents)"' and German
(0.4%)"' do not come close to meeting the 20% requirement or
even the lower end 8.5% requirement. Spanish (12.2%)' may
meet the lower end of the requirement, but, at least in likelihood of
confusion cases, the doctrine does not consider whether the foreign
language speakers also speak English.
ii. The Doctrine Improperly Presumes that Foreign Language
Speakers Also Speak English
Even if the doctrine were correct in its assumption that all
common, modem languages will be spoken or understood by an
appreciable number of American consumers, the doctrine further
improperly assumes that the consumer is "knowledgeable in
English as well as the pertinent foreign language."' 89 Knowledge
of English as well as the foreign language would be required in any
likelihood of confusion analysis, since a consumer would need to
understand both the English and foreign marks to be confused by
83 See id
184 1n re Savisa (PTY) Ltd., No. 78154196, 2005 WL 548058, at *4 (T.T.A.B.
Feb. 24, 2005); see also Consol. Cigar Corp. v. Rembrandt Tobacco Corp.
(Overseas) Ltd., 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159, 159 (T.T.A.B. 1972).
85 U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 58 (dividing B29 by B5).
186 1d. (dividing B14 by B5).
187 Id. (dividing B23 by B5).
I8 8 1d (dividing B10 by B5).
189 In re Unidos Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 77126814, 2010 WL 667922, at *3
(T.T.A.B. Jan. 27, 2010) (emphasis added) (citing In re Thomas, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1021, 1024 (T.T.A.B. 2006)); In re La Peregrina, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1645,
1647-48 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (citing Thomas, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1025).
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their similarity.
Depending on the foreign language, however, there may be a
large percentage of speakers who do not speak English very well.'90
According to the U.S. Census, speakers of many foreign languages
in the United States do not speak English very well."' For
example, with respect to the most widely spoken foreign language
in the United States-Spanish-47% of speakers do not speak
English very well.'92 Other commonly spoken foreign languages in
America have similarly large percentages of speakers who do not
speak English very well.' Therefore, in a confusing similarity
analysis, the doctrine incorrectly assumes that all speakers of a
foreign language would be able to translate a foreign mark to
English and then compare it to an English mark.
This flaw in the doctrine further impedes its policy goal of
protecting multilingual Americans. Consumers who only speak
the pertinent foreign language, but speak English poorly or not at
all, cannot be confused by equivalent foreign and English marks.
Thus, for the large portion of foreign language speakers who do
not speak English well, the doctrine provides little or no protection.
b. The Doctrine Causes Affirmative Harm to the Public
The primary policy rationale for the doctrine is the protection
190 The U.S. Census considers households "linguistically isolated ... in which
no person aged 14 or over speaks English at least '[v]ery well."' Hyon B. Shin
& Rosalind Bruno, Language Use and English-Speaking Ability: 2000, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, 10 (Oct. 2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/ c2kbr-
29.pdf.
'9' See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 58 (dividing D10 by B10) (47%
of Spanish speakers do not speak English very well).
192 Id. Spanish speakers are by no means outliers. For example, 49% of
Asian and Pacific Island language speakers in the United States also do not
speak English very well. Id. (row 93).
1 See, e.g., id. (row 38) (Russian-51%); id. (row 94) (Chinese-56%); id
(row 104) (Korean-58%); id. (row 109) (Vietnamese-61%). Other common
foreign languages have smaller but still significant percentages of people who
do not speak English very well. See, e.g., id. (row 13) (French-22%); id. (row
18) (Italian-29%).
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of multilingual Americans.194 As the Federal Circuit has noted,
''one policy undergirding the doctrine of foreign equivalents is the
assumption that there are (or someday will be) customers in the
U.S. who speak that foreign language."'91 However, while
protecting multilingual Americans may be a laudable goal, the
doctrine does this at the expense of the rest of the public. The
doctrine may ensure that a negligible portion of the public is not
confused or otherwise negatively affected by a mark, but in doing
so, it harms the public at large by eliminating a valuable
opportunity to distinguish goods in the marketplace through a
registered trademark."6
Furthermore, the absence of federal registration makes it much
more difficult for the would-be registrant to use his mark
exclusively and police it, since he would have to rely on state
trademark protections to do so.' 97 This nonexclusive use of a mark
tends to confuse consumers due to the increased likelihood of
multiple merchants selling the same good under the same name.
c. The Doctrine Causes Prospective Harm
Considering whether "someday [there] will be" an adequate
194 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 12:41 n.5 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 14 cmt. a (1995) ("The multilingual
character of the purchasing public and the increasing exposure to foreign terms
on imported goods justify general adherence to the 'doctrine of foreign
equivalents."')).
19 In re Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1356 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Enrique Bernat F., S.A. v. Guadalajara, Inc.,
210 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2000)).
196 "The purpose of federal trademark registration and protection is to ...
protect the public from confusion regarding products and product sources." Jack
Achiezer Guggenheim, Renaming the Redskins (and the Florida State
Seminoles?): The Trademark Registration Decision and Alternative Remedies,
27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 287, 292 (1999) (citing Springfield Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. Founders' Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 115 F. Supp. 787, 791 (N.D. Cal.
1953)). The Lanham Act "confers a number of procedural and substantive legal
advantages over reliance on common law rights." 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 3,
§ 19:9 (discussing advantages of registration).
19' Although some protection may be available under common law, federal
registration gives a trademark owner significantly greater protection. See 3
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 19:9 (discussing advantages of registration).
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number of speakers of a particular foreign language is an improper
rationale for applying the doctrine.'98 Trademark law generally
looks at the composition of the present day, not future, public.'"
For example, in reviewing a rejection based on immoral or
scandalous matter,200 the Board reversed the examiner's refusal of
registration, explaining that the mark "involve[s] no threat to
present-day public morals or sense of propriety."20' Similarly, in a
likelihood of confusion case, the Board noted that it looks to "the
average present day consumer under the conditions and
circumstances surrounding his purchases in the everyday market
place."202 Therefore, simply assuming there will someday be an
adequate number of foreign language speakers is not a proper basis
for continued application of the doctrine.
This prospective justification for the doctrine does not further
the policy of the Lanham Act of "protect[ing] the public's
expectation regarding the source and quality of goods." 203 Indeed,
if the public does not presently speak a certain foreign language,
there is no need to protect it from marks in that language in the
hope that, one day, that protection may become necessary.
Applying the doctrine based on this misguided policy subverts the
policy goals of the Lanham Act by refusing registration to rightful
trademark owners. This creates a situation in which the refused
registrant's competitors can use the mark, confusing the public as
to the "source and quality of goods." 204 Moreover, if a court is
wrong about there someday being enough consumers who speak a
relevant foreign language, a mark would needlessly be refused
registration, preventing its owner from receiving the protections of
'9 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
'9 See, e.g., In re Thomas Labs., Inc., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 50, 52 (T.T.A.B.
1975); Am. Can Co. v. Marcal Paper Mills, Inc., 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 772, 777
(T.T.A.B. 1967).
200 See generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 19:77 (discussing immoral or
scandalous marks).
201 Thomas Labs., 189 U.S.P.Q. at 52 (emphasis added).
202 Am. Can Co., 152 U.S.P.Q. at 777 (emphasis added); see also Henry
Disston & Sons, Inc. v. Pa. Saw Corp., 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145 (Comm'r Pat.
1947) (referring to "present-day public" in a likelihood of confusion analysis).
203 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.204 See id.
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the Lanham Act in the meantime.20 5
2. The Doctrine is Unworkable
In addition to its failure to achieve its policy rationale as well
as that of the Lanham Act, the doctrine is ridden with confusion 206
and, in many cases, an utter lack of reasoning. In particular, the
Federal Circuit has never made clear what constitutes a common
language,207 in what cases consumers would be unlikely to translate
foreign marks,208 and on whom the burden of proof of likelihood of
translation lies.209 Perhaps most importantly, the Federal Circuit's
decision in Spirits, aside from being confusing and internally
inconsistent,20 has forced the T.T.A.B. to unreasonably use a
different definition of "ordinary American purchaser" for
geographic deceptiveness refusals than all other bars to
registration.21 1
As the Supreme Court has explained, case law should be
overruled as unworkable if it creates "inherent confusion" or
cannot be "coheren[tly] and consisten[tly]" applied.2 2 The
doctrine easily fits either of these characterizations and,
consequently, must be abolished.
In sum, the doctrine of foreign equivalents violates directly
applicable Supreme Court precedent, as well the requirement of
proportionality, and is, in nearly every respect, unworkable. As
such, the doctrine undercuts the policy of the Lanham Act to
protect the public at the expense of the doctrine's policy of
protecting an often negligible portion of multilingual Americans.
For these reasons, the Federal Circuit should abolish the doctrine
as a matter of precedent and policy.
205 See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2006); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 19:9
(discussing the advantages of registration).
206 See supra note 95.
207 See supra Part III.B.
208 See supra Part II.D.
209 See supra Part III.E.210 See supra Part V.B.
211 See supra Part VI.C.
212 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court squarely rejected the doctrine of foreign
equivalents in Menendez v. Holt over a century ago. The Federal
Circuit, and other courts considering the doctrine, must follow
stare decisis and abolish the doctrine.
In the Federal Circuit's tortured In re Spirits International
decision, the court signaled the beginning of the end of the doctrine
of foreign equivalents by abolishing it sub silentio in the
geographic deceptiveness context.2 13 By doing so, the court only
muddled the waters of an already confused body of law.
As the Board predicted, the Federal Circuit's insistence in
Spirits that the "ordinary American purchaser" refers to the entire
relevant public as opposed to the portion of the public
knowledgeable in the foreign language, "write[s] the doctrine out
of existence."214 Although the Federal Circuit expressly limited its
analysis to subsection 2(e)(3)'s prohibition of primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks, the court cannot
justify refusing to extend Spirits' reasoning to other bars to
registration.
The Federal Circuit should speak decisively and abolish the
doctrine of foreign equivalents in its entirety. Although the
Federal Circuit chipped away at the doctrine in Spirits and held it
effectively inapplicable to geographic deceptiveness cases, the
court should finish what it started by following both Menendez and
policy considerations to put the doctrine of foreign equivalents to
rest in toto.
213 See supra Part IV.B.
214 In re Thomas, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1021, 1024 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
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